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Abstract. The main purpose of this article is analysis of question of future in philosophy 
of August Cieszkowski. Amog Polish philosophers Cieszkowski was one of the most 
important thinker, who creatively developed the philosophy of George Hegel, added 
new question, such as “future”. For clarity of analysis the essay is divided into two parts. 
The first part is connected with problem of future in Cieszkowski’s philosophy with 
references to social and religious fields. The second one included analysis of relations 
between social and religious changes and revolution.
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There was nothing I had considered more than the concept of destiny
Charles Fourier, Théorie des quatre mouvements
August Cieszkowski having emerged in the world-wide philosophy was 
the event that must be regarded as exceptional. That – almost panegyric 
– judgment results mainly from the importance of his thought and from 
the fact that he is apparently the only Polish XIX-century philosopher rec-
ognized and highly valued abroad. We can also claim that he is much more 
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popular with Western philosophers than in Poland. As a philosopher, Ciesz-
kowski was appreciated mainly for his work Prolegomena to a Historiosophy 
(Prolegomena zur Historiosophie, 1838), in which he included a couple of 
essential thoughts related to the revision of Georg W. F. Hegel’s philoso-
phy. It is to be emphasized that Cieszkowski, representing quite a unique 
understanding of Heglism, inspired the philosophers belonging to the so-
called Left Hegelians. Thus, he contributed to the ambiguous evaluation of 
his relations with Young Hegelians and with the influence on the thought 
by Moses Hess and Karol Marx. Even more so because his later works, such 
as God and Palingenesis (Gott und Paligenesie, 1842) or Our Father (Ojcze 
Nasz, 1848–1906) are concerned with the issues plainly unacceptable for 
Young Hegelians.
The attractiveness of Cieszkowski’s philosophy involves its ambigui-
ty or even the multitude of threads included in his works. It is attractive 
not only in the context of making an attempt to conduct the synthesis 
of his thought but also – and primarily so – in the sense of reading his 
works as vital for contemporary philosophy (social philosophy inclusive)1. 
We can observe it in the question of future, tackled by Cieszkowski, future 
proving to be one of the fundamental threads under consideration in his 
works. The question of future is also a thread referring to the question of 
change (including revolution) and a few other minor issues. It should be 
emphasized that undertaking the discussion of such problems contributed 
to the growth of popularity of Cieszkowski’s works – mainly with Young 
Hegelians but it also cause the severe criticism on the part of Catholic 
writers (cf.  Jakubowski 1989, 146; Keller 1948, 42; Sojka 1986, 21). The 
consequence of the above fact is that from a few dozen years, the analy-
sis of Cieszkowski’s philosophy causes major troubles related to opposing 
evaluations of his major works, that is Prolegomena to a Historiosophy and 
1 The clear example of such resemblances may be the representatives of Frankfurt School, 
mainly Max Horkheimer – in the criticism of progress and Alex Honneth in his concept 
of “recognition”. It is worthwhile to compare Cieszkowski’s writings with Critique of 
Instrumental Reason of Horkheimer and The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar 
of Social Conflicts of Honneth. 
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Our Father. The discrepancies between those evaluations resulted mainly 
from the fact, that generally one of the facets of Cieszkowski’s philoso-
phy was accentuated. The aim was to connect the concept of “future” with 
“change”, which could be both understood in the spirit of Young Hegelians 
or Marxism as revolution. On the other hand, what is important here is the 
decisively different evaluation expressed in religious categories and not 
related to social or political issues. We can also suppose that the lack of 
consensus between researchers stemmed to a large extend from the ideo-
logical orientation of the research, which impeded the general overview of 
Cieszkowski’s philosophy. What counts in favour of assuming such a view-
point is the words of the philosopher himself saying that he cherished 
leitmotif thought expressed most fully in Our Father. Thus, he replied to his 
son: “Whatever I had written since then, Our Father being my everything, 
belongs to that work, refers to it or departs from it […]. Everything – these 
are branches of one tree, Yet, once in a while I departed from the trunk and 
worked on its twigs” (Cieszkowski 1908, II). Taking the above-stated words 
as a hypothesis, we might claim that these two facets of his philosophy do 
not have to be mutually contradictory; they can in fact complement one 
another. And the key to the general understanding of Cieszkowski’s philos-
ophy is the concept of “future”, which combines the religious issues with 
the concept of change. That is why, we might justifiably use the formula-
tion “philosophy of future” and make it an interesting and scientifically 
important thread in the thought of the Polish philosopher.
1. Understanding of the concept “future”
The departure point for understanding the foundations of August Ciesz-
kowski’s philosophy of future is the philosophical system by Hegel and 
more strictly speaking: Hegelian resistance to events which have not oc-
curred yet. That fear was so characteristic of his philosophy that only when 
the distant future was gradually becoming “the painful present” he had 
to mark it with the status of “rationality. In Leszek Kołakowski’s opinion, 
Hegelian rationalism even forbids the philosophy from thinking of what is 
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yet to come and forces it to remain satisfied with understanding of what 
had already happened (Kołakowski 2000, 105). It means that the present is 
worth recognizing as valid when it overwhelms us with its necessity thus 
disabling keeping the so-far theoretical indifference to present events. The 
most conspicuous example of accepting the present and the fear of future 
is Hegel’s attitude towards French revolution, which he recognized only 
at the moment of its spread-out. Jürgen Habermas draws our attention to 
the fact that Hegel, enclosing the revolution in the beating heart of the 
spirit of the world, felt that he is not threatened by it (Habermas 1983, 
153). Hegelian fear of future is here equivalent with the fear of the change, 
which being quite difficult to control and to be conceptualized in terms 
of dialectics. We must emphasize the fact that it is Hegelian dialectics in 
which the essence for understanding Cieszkowski’s philosophy of future 
lies. Revaluating dialectics, he addressed the drawbacks in Hegelian system 
causing the state of being constrained within the limits of the past and the 
tamed present. In Cieszkowski’s opinion, such a state of affairs is unaccept-
able because we cannot affirm that history is terminated when the present 
takes effect and neither can we posit that history will be no longer subject 
to further development (Cieszkowski 1972, 5). That is why he postulated 
that the process of grasping the essence of history must encompass both 
past, present and the future. (Cieszkowski 1972, 7).
The revision of Hegelian thought singled out “future” and made it one 
of the most important concepts in Cieszkowski’s philosophy. However, in 
Prolegomena to a Historiosophy that issue is not expressed so vividly as in 
Our Father and it refers mainly to the complementation of Hegelian dia-
lectics. Introducing the concept of “future”, he thought that it is necessary 
to the general grasp of the evolution of history. It led to the dismissal of 
Hegelian four-fold division position assumed by Hegel and transforming 
it into the trychotomic division embracing: antique (the epoch of arts), 
the present (the epoch of thought) and future (the epoch of act) (Walicki 
1972, XII). In his opinion, the present introducing the epoch of thought, as 
Hegel insisted, cannot mean the end of history because it is at odds with 
dialectics. Secondly, the preset encompasses the introduction of forth-
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coming events, which cannot be overstated. The present is the transitory 
period, the bridge leading to future events (Keller 1948, 76). The reason to 
assume that almost prophetic position is the chiliastic tradition of three-
stage evolution of history assumed by utopian socialists, mainly by Henri 
de Saint-Simon and Charles Forurier. One cannot lose out of sight the mes-
sianic romanticism based on the belief that there are other non-rational 
factor operating and the faith in the new epoch of human happiness and 
the definitive defeat of the evil by the good (Keller 1948, 21). We can add 
that what Cieszkowski mainly meant – as in the case of other romanticists 
– was the predicament Poland was caught in, and that is the attempts to 
fight for independence of it.
Searching for the key to the correct interpretation of the philosophy of 
future as well as allocating to it the locus in the world philosophy, we can 
make use of the paraphrase of the words by Karol Marx originating from 
Theses on Feuerbach, and having it that philosophers differently described 
the past but the point is to focus on the future2. Substituting “past” for the 
word “interpretation” and “future” for “change” seems understandable or 
even obvious. For a change to be implemented, there must be some future 
looming. The future should transcend what was introduced by the past and 
what was maintained by the present. However, Marx’ thought, though it has 
the far-reaching implications in the form of revaluations in the realm of 
social investigations (to a greater degree than in the realm of philosophy), 
when referred to Cieszkowki’s works acquires the greater depth of scientific 
reflection. It results from the fact that Marxian “change” does not refer to 
the “future” in the sense Cieszkowski’s described the issue. That fact must 
be underlined because by combining ”future” with “change”, he introduces 
the concept of “act”, which (in his sense of it) refers us not only to the realm 
of praxis, but most of all to episteme.
From the above, there seems to emerge the necessity to delineate the 
possibility of knowing the future appealing to the framework of dialectics. 
As Cieszkowski put it in Prolegomena to a Historiosophy:
2 What is meant is the well-known thesis 11: “The philosophers have only interpreted the 
world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marks 1975, 8).
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past manifests the depth and generality contained in it and it shows how per-
fectly its essence is expressed in the very fact of existing. On the other hand, as 
for the future, we can only explore the essence of progress because the possibil-
ity of implementations are so vast; the freedom and the enormity of Spirit so 
great that we are always in danger that reality in its detail will either overtake 
or at least frustrates our expectations (Cieszkowski 1972, 9).
We can claim that – similarly to Hegel – for Cieszkowski the future seemed 
to be shrouded in the mist of mystery but still fearful. However, it is the 
case only when the enquires about the future are oriented at searching for 
details and not its essence, which can be only cognized (Cieszkowski 1972: 
9). The very process of cognizing it may be realized two-fold: rationally 
or by means of prophecies (Keller 1948, 77–78). It is to be stressed that 
addressing these two mutually contradictory ways of cognizing the future 
results from the analysis of the contents of Prolegomena to a Historiosophy 
and Our Father, in which Cieszkowski drew our attention to other methods 
of reaching what is unknown. In the first case, the reason is able to discover 
the future thanks to dialectics, which points to the future as a necessary 
stage transcending the past and the present. Józef Keller went as far as to 
claim that the future is yet unfulfilled truth which can be discovered by re-
sorting to dialectical principles themselves (Keller 1948, 76)3. On the other 
hand, Our Father contains a religious aspect of cognizability of the future. 
It is related to the faith in the emergence of the new epoch understood as 
the emergence of “The Kingdom of Heaven” on Earth. Awaiting the materi-
alization of that better new world stems from the chiliastic faith in the suc-
cessive period of history as well as from the prayer, which, in Cieszkowski’s 
opinion, contains some hope for the advent of the new epoch. The prayer, 
described in Our Father, is described as the perfect example of the aware-
ness of anticipating the new times. The philosopher compares it with the 
request which contain the desire to possess what we don’t have yet; what we 
miss and what we except from the future. (Cieszkowski 1922, 12). However, 
3 Cieszkowski’s account was based on the account of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who postulated 
the possibility of cognizing the future through understanding the past and the present 
(cf. Keller 1948, 76).
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the hope for “the happier tomorrow” does not refer to individual wishes but 
to communal ones, which are supposed to make future gain the same status 
and significance as the past and the present (cf. Cieszkowski 1922, 13).
Going back to Prolegomena to a Historiosophy, it should be noted that 
basing the considerations on dialectics was to guarantee cognizing the 
future and not conjecturing which form the future might assume. That 
is why Cieszkowski wrote that “we are not aiming at guessing one or the 
other detail, that is at the prophecy related to a given agent or an act but 
the aim is to explore the proper nature of humanity and to define the law 
governing its progress” (Cieszkowski 1972, 10). Thus, he points to the con-
cept of “prophecy”, which introduces the critical difficulty in proving the 
consistency in his thoughts. What we mean here is that the “prophecy” is 
identified with “conjecturing”, that is non-scientific method of learning 
about the possible future. That method, which we can call “conjecturing” is 
cognitively useless because it is not subject to the law of dialectics. Ciesz-
kowski also maintained that dialectics, being consistent with scientific 
methods, for example paleontology, enables to infer the future from the 
past (cf. Cieszkowski 1972, 10–11; Walicki 1972, XII). Furthermore, we can 
point to the complexities resulting from the negative nature of “prophecy” 
which emerges from the its juxtaposition with “foretelling”4. It turns out 
that the negatively characterized “prophecy” is identical with “foretelling”, 
the latter being conceptualized as the way of cognizing the future. We can 
suppose that the incoherence between these two methods of cognition re-
sults from the fact that in those opposite ways – and not fully in accordance 
with each other – he characterized the future in his main works. There is 
another interpretation possible. Namely, focusing our attention on the 
dialectical model of inferring the future from the past and the present and 
searching in them the hints of the future, he pointed to two planes in which 
the future might be realized. What we mean here is a social and spiritual 
dimension, both planes calling for proving the dimensions of their trans-
formations. What is more, following the thought of Cieszkowski’s, we can 
4 Foretelling, as assumed by Keller, is contained in the prayer (cf. Keller: 1948: 79).
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do the valuing of the attitudes expressed in social (and political one above 
all) and spiritual awaiting of the future. The priority is given to the prophe-
cy included in the prayer Our Father, because it gives hope for a better fate. 
On the other hand, the future inferred from the dialectics does not offer 
that; what is more, it may prove to be more intolerable than the present.
2. The concept of total change
Undertaking the analysis of the concept of “future”, we should always keep 
in mind that the concept has some explicit interrelations with the con-
cept of “change”. In any case, that is the fact in which we might notice 
the consistency between Cieszkowski’s thought and the thought of Young 
Hegelians and Marx himself, who jointly criticized Hegel’s philosophy as 
resistant to focusing the attention on future events5. Despite their com-
mon point of departure, Polish philosopher presented a different line of 
reasoning than Marx by rejecting the radical form of the change in the 
form of revolution, believing that it is not the proper way to implement 
“The Kingdom of Heaven” on Earth.(cf. Żółtowski 1922, 10–11). Due to 
the above, it is justifiable to present an answer to the question of how he 
understood the concept of change. Undertaking the analysis of that issue, 
we should be aware that this concept as conceived of by Cieszkowski may 
seem incoherent. It is because the issue of future and the changes related 
to it was present mainly in Prolegomena to a Historiosophy and Our Father; 
yet, it was accentuated differently in each of them.
Comparing the above-mentioned expectation of the advent of the new 
times with the contents of Prolegomena to a Historiosophy, what seems 
disturbing and making us wonder is the words referring to “the performers 
of history”, who come into the scene at the moment of the materialization 
of the epoch of act (Cieszkowski 1972, 12). The phrase might prove to be 
confounding: who did Cieszkowski mean, mentioning the actors acting for 
5 We do not mean to give any ground to the common belief that Marx borrowed from Ciesz-
kowski’s philosophy. The intention is rather to point to coincidences between them. 
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the sake of the materialization of the future. Confronting that thought with 
Marx viewpoint on the primacy of the working class in shaping the face of 
the new time, we should note that he is not pointing to proletariat as the 
performers of the historical agenda. We may suppose that Cieszkowski 
seems to be a representative of a typical Polish romanticist looking ahe-
ad for the emergence of a charismatic leader (Janion 2007, 395). It means 
that he represented a typically messianic understanding of the future, not 
following the clues specified by left Hegelians and utopian socialist. Ciesz-
kowski’s contemporary Edward Dembowski in his Thoughts about the Future 
of Philosophy (Myśli o przyszłości filozofii) claimed that messianism leads 
only to the adoration a charismatic leader’s genius and not to real progress 
(Dembowski 1955, 372–373). As a consequence, messianism proclaimed by 
Polish romanticists did not lead to correlating the future with action and 
changes in the social realm (Janion 2007, 395). Assuming such a viewpoint, 
we must state that Cieszkowski did not take up the challenge by left Hege-
lians and Marxism taking shape at that time. Instead Cieszkowski was in 
favour of the romantic image related to the fight for the future.
The lack of clarity in the attitude to “the performers of history” is in-
terestingly continued in Our Father, in which the philosopher does not 
entirely dismiss social issues. As we can read:
Here is before our eyes, the unanticipated miracles of industry – here are the 
unthought – of treasures of science – here are still growing traces of huge and 
hectic labour; – here are the luxuries of which the Sybarites could never think 
of – here are the forces that the imagination could not even attribute to the 
fairy-tale Titans (Cieszkowski 1922, 1–2).
On the basis of the sentences quoted, one can get the impression that Ciesz-
kowski directly refers to the issue of the working class (Sajdek 2008, 94) and 
the dynamically burgeoning capitalism. It is worthwhile to pay attention to 
the fact that his thoughts related to the issues of working class are quite 
general and do not indicate the unambiguous inclination to follow Young 
Hegelians and neither do they indicate calling for radical social (and po-
litical) changes. What it all means is that by not sharing the enthusiasm 
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for revolution, he was trying to imagine the advent of the new epoch as 
coming shortly. The difference is that opposite to the horizontally oriented 
Hegelian leftists, he was in favour of vertical visions of utopian socialists. 
It should be emphasized that the issue of a working class was presented by 
Cieszkowski as the one in need of change and intervention but not by means 
of the concepts approximating Marxist “alienation” and “class conflicts”. 
What is more, he even thought that the pathway beaten by the revolution 
will not lead to the solution of social injustice and neither will it make the 
new happy epoch more feasible. The evidence for the above is quite a long 
excerpt from Our Father:
And besides to all that, the populace and populaces –desire – and moan char-
acteristically! – why was all that for? What is it leading? What is the gain of the 
science by scholars – what has the labour of working class gained? – what has 
the gold of the rich bought, – what has the bravery of nations fought – what 
have the tears of so many nations washed away? –Holy God – what is happen-
ing in the world? What had happened once in history is recurring again- but it 
will not occur anymore as long as humanity is humanity: the second “solstice” 
of humankind. The old world is dying – and the new one is being born – the 
third world is taking shape (Cieszkowski 1922, 2).
Juxtaposing two major works by Cieszkowki, we can believe that he was 
devoted to Hegelian philosophy and simultaneously he shared Hegel’s fear 
related to revolution. However, he consistently developed his views related 
to the introduction to dialectics the idea of future and awaiting its advent 
in the ultimate form.
In his opinion, revolution seemed to be misguided not only due to the 
fact that it does not abolish suffering and it falsifies the picture of reali-
ty what we could have learned from the section above; but also due to 
dialectics itself. Especially in Our Father, he was pointing to the fact that 
revolution can by no means give rise to the introduction of the new epoch. 
Strictly speaking, reforms and revolutions are not the foundations of a new 
edifice but only the dismissal or the rearrangement of the old one (Ciesz-
kowski 1972, 34 and 168; Cieszkowski 1923a, 181).
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It means that revolution, when conceived of within the framework of 
dialectics, proves to be only an antithesis and should not be considered 
synthesis. In other words, by negating the present we only express its “erra-
tic movements” (Cieszkowski 1972: 41), and we do not step into the future. 
The emergence of the new epoch in the future should be characterized by 
the appearance of new so-far unknown values and attitudes. It is worth 
adding that they are not – unlike in Marxism – attitudes expressed po-
litically but spiritually. Assuming such a manner of understanding Ciesz-
kowski’s thought, we can claim that his criticism of revolution is coherent 
and consistent. After all, he expressed it not only in Our Father, but also in 
Prolegomena to a Historiosophy, where we can read that “the Kingdom of 
Heaven” may materialize only when the human action will be conscious, 
free and permeated with love (Cieszkowski 1972, 15–16). However, what is 
an issue here is the way in which its materialization is possible. What is 
more, treating Cieszkowski’s religious inclination seriously, it can be only 
some total change that can give rise to establishing the new epoch, while 
the total change proves to be nothing else than revolution itself. Trying 
to understand the decisive criticism of revolution and the simultaneous 
assumption of the image of the total change, we must bear in mind that 
what we have here is two realm: the political and the spiritual one. The 
former, as we remember, could not give rise to initiating – essentially – the 
new time. On the other hand, the latter, in Cieszkowski’s opinion, is able to 
attain that goal. However, we must admit that the introduction of the total 
change may be realized only as a “leap”, reminiscent of Marxian “leap into 
the kingdom of freedom” (cf. Walicki 1996, 26). Thereby, we can say that 
the concept of a total change in the form of the vision of “the Kingdom of 
Heaven” on Earth is nothing else than a revolution. It must be added that 
it is a revolution of spiritual nature.
 Correlating the future with freedom and awareness has one more in-
teresting aspect. What is mean here is focusing on the spiritual and not on 
the political dimension of the transformation of reality. The distinction 
between politics and spirituality is so vital because without it we would be 
unable to comprehend more precisely what he had meant by correlating the 
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future with the freedom and awareness. On the political plane – contrary to 
what Marxism suggests – action does not cause the man to be liberated from 
the harassing fate and does not contribute to extending the knowledge of 
humankind. That is because he or she does not become a formulator of that 
new epoch but of a new political hegemony. It should be added that Ciesz-
kowski only hints at such an understanding without introducing further 
explanations of the key concept in this context, that is “hegemony”. The 
most conspicuous hint is his presentation of the dialectical movement of 
the emergence of dominating (or rather leading) political groups, which af-
ter all emerge only as antithesis but not as synthesis (cf. Cieszkowski 1972, 
25 and 83). The lack of synthesis results from the fact that revolutionary 
movements are not characterized by achieving the state of knowledge on 
the essence of the world and the involvement of a human in it (Cieszkowski 
1923b, 149). What should be understood by it is that only on the spiritual 
level, one might be liberated from the present and conduct the total change 
enabling one to make the “Kingdom of Heaven” on Earth materialize.
Conclusions
Clive S. Lewis in The Screwtape Letters put a highly intriguing sentence: 
“Gratitude directs us towards the past, love towards the present, fear, greed 
and unchastity and ambitions towards the future” (Lewis 1993, 86). That 
thought in the context of Cieszkowski’s philosophy of future might instill 
some uneasiness and might pose the question whether it is worthwhile 
to be open to the future? It is because that openness includes the act of 
awaiting the future. The latter, in turn, might be expressed in striving to 
realize “the new time” being manifested in greed, unchastity, and – as mi-
ght infer from Lewis’ intentions – dishonourable ambitions. However, the 
openness to the future – if we listen carefully to the words pronounced by 
Polish philosopher – expressed mainly hope. The hope for dreams about 
the a better world coming true. Also Marx’ thought contains that hope, 
Marx’ thought being coinciding with Cieszkowski’s idea, which is the belief 
that we have nothing to lose except for our chains (Marks 1976, 125). The 
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difference is that priority is a revolution on the spiritual level, which can 
lead to alterations in interpersonal relations (also international relations). 
Thus, as opposed to Marx’ considerations postulating first and foremost 
the changes in the socio-economic (and political) realm.
Eventually, it is worth to emphasize that Cieszkowski had a difficulty 
with transcending the forms of reasoning imposed by the epoch he lived 
in. That is why the question of future was not delineated as clearly as we 
might wish. Because – despite the assumptions related to the dialectical 
and religious modes of cognition – it cannot be well defined. Therefore, it 
is worthwhile to regard Cieszkowski’s philosophy of future as making us 
open to what has not happened yet rather than to seeking the methodology 
of research on future. That is because future is not subject to epistemology 
but to the realm of hope (Szulakiewicz 2001, 45).
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